Ch 7 Federalism

Chapter 7, “Federalism,” examines the constitutional and political arrangements that distribute power between the central government and the States in India. The chapter opens by contrasting India’s successful experience with federalism against countries like the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan that broke up, and Canada which came close to breakup. Despite India’s immense diversities:over 20 major languages, several major religions, and millions of indigenous peoples:the country has remained united for over seven decades.

The chapter explains that federalism is not a fixed set of principles but an institutional mechanism that has evolved differently in different countries. Essentially, federalism accommodates two sets of polities: one at the regional level (States) and another at the national level (Union), with each government autonomous in its own sphere.

A written constitution, considered supreme, spells out the division of powers, and an independent judiciary settles disputes between the two levels. However, the chapter emphasizes that real politics, culture, ideology, and history:particularly a culture of trust, cooperation, and mutual respect:determine the actual working of a federation.

The chapter details the federal provisions in the Indian Constitution. Even before Independence, national leaders recognized the need to divide powers between provinces and the central government to govern a large, diverse country. The Constituent Assembly decided to frame a government based on the principles of unity and cooperation between the centre and States.

The Constitution does not even mention the word ‘federation’; Article 1 describes India as a “Union of States,” emphasizing that the union is indestructible while States can be reorganized. Powers are divided through three lists: the Union List (defence, currency, foreign affairs, etc. :Parliament alone can legislate), the State List (police, agriculture, local government, etc. :State legislatures alone can legislate), and the Concurrent List (criminal law, education, marriage, etc. :both can legislate, but Union law prevails in case of conflict).

Residuary powers (matters not mentioned in any list) belong to the Union. However, the Constitution creates a strong central government for several reasons: the need to integrate over 500 princely States, concerns for national unity, and the belief that socio-economic problems like poverty and illiteracy required planning and coordination by a strong centre.

Key provisions strengthening the centre include: Parliament’s power to form new States, alter boundaries, or change names of States (Article 3); emergency provisions (Articles 352, 356, 360) that can turn the federal polity into a highly centralized system; financial powers where revenue-generating items are controlled by the centre, leaving States dependent on grants and assistance; the Governor’s power to reserve bills for the President’s assent; the integrated administrative system through All-India Services (IAS, IPS) where officers serving in States are under central control; and the Rajya Sabha’s power to authorize Parliament to legislate on State subjects.

The chapter then examines conflicts in India’s federal system. Centre-State relations have evolved through three phases: the 1950s-60s under Congress dominance, when relations remained normal except on the issue of State formation; the mid-1960s onwards, when opposition parties came to power in many States, leading to demands for greater autonomy; and the 1990s onwards, with coalition politics at the centre and regional parties gaining strength, resulting in a greater say for States and more mature federalism.

Demands for autonomy have included: changes in division of powers in favour of States, financial autonomy (independent sources of revenue), greater administrative powers, and cultural/linguistic autonomy (opposition to Hindi domination in Tamil Nadu, promotion of Punjabi language). The role of Governors has been particularly controversial:appointed by the central government, often viewed as interfering in State functioning, especially when different parties rule at centre and State.

The Sarkaria Commission (appointed 1983, reported 1988) recommended that Governor appointments should be strictly non-partisan. Article 356 (President’s Rule) has been a major source of conflict:used sparingly till 1967, but after that frequently invoked to dismiss State governments led by opposition parties, sometimes without testing their majority on the floor of the House.

The Supreme Court has ruled that the constitutional validity of imposing President’s Rule can be examined by the judiciary. Demands for new States have been ongoing, based largely on linguistic and cultural identity: States Reorganisation Commission (1953) recommended linguistic States; Gujarat and Maharashtra created in 1960; Punjab and Haryana separated in 1966; north-eastern States reorganized; and in 2000, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, and Jharkhand were created; Telangana was formed in 2014. Interstate conflicts include border disputes (Belgaum between Maharashtra and Karnataka, Chandigarh between Punjab and Haryana) and river water disputes (Cauvery between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, Narmada among Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra).

The chapter concludes with special provisions for certain States, particularly north-eastern States with sizeable indigenous tribal populations and distinct history/culture. Jammu and Kashmir had special status under Article 370 (since abrogated in 2019 and bifurcated into two Union Territories), which required State concurrence for making laws on Union and Concurrent List matters, gave the State its own constitution and flag, and limited the Union’s emergency powers.

The chapter emphasizes that federalism is like a rainbow where each colour is separate yet together they make a harmonious pattern:no legal or institutional formula alone can guarantee smooth functioning; ultimately, the people and political process must develop a culture of mutual trust, toleration, and cooperation. National unity cannot be built by streamlining differences; forced unity only generates greater social strife and alienation. A responsive polity sensitive to diversities and demands for autonomy alone can be the basis of a cooperative federation.